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Abstract 
Debates over the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster pointed to a 
set of institutional and organizational failures in Japan's nuc1ear regulation 
as a primary cause of the disaster. Whi1e the Japanese government has 
implemented reforms to strengthen nuc1ear regulation， I argue that these 
reforms have largely left out the education system as a key institution that 
produces and distributes expertise necessary for nuc1ear regulation. First， the 
Japanese education system has traditionally produced only a small number of 
experts in the fields related to nuc1ear regulation， aligned top-ranked experts 
with the pro回nuc1eargovernment， and weakened the civ1 society's capacity 
to mobi1ize counter-experts. Second， the education system has downplayed 
social-scientific perspectives in energy and environmental education capable 
of critically examining institutional and organizational dimensions of nuc1ear 
regulation. These problems， however， fel outside the purview of post-
Fukushima regulatory reforms and， asthe result， the education system remains 
the weakest institutionallink in Japan's nuc1ear regulation. 
Keywords: Expertise， Science and Technology， Social Studies， Japanese 
Education 
Between 2011 and 2012， three investigative reports on the cause of 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster were published: a nongovemmental 
report by the Rebuild J apan Initiative F oundation (RJIF)， a governmental report 
by the Investigation Committee (IC) established within the Cabinet Office， 
and another govemmental report-the most comprehensive of the 伽 ee-
by the Fukushima Nuc1ear Accident Independent Investigation Commission 
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(NAIIC) of the National Diet of Japan. Although none of these reports was 
able to pinpoint the direct cause of the nuclear disaster due to a lack of 
sufficient information on the damaged nuclear reactors， they al agreed that 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government had 
failed to install necessary safety measures against earthquakes and tsunami， 
which led to the failures of cooling water systems and the eventual meltdown 
ofnuclear fuels. As the NAIIC r白eportstated blun凶ltl弘y弘~the nuclear disaster wasピ‘“6
pro:6おoun江泊dlyma釦nma“dedisaster" (NAIIC 2012a: 9). 
Indeed， disasters that involve advanced technologies are typically 
caused by organizational fai1ures (Perrow 1984， Vaughan 1996， 1999). Even 
“natural" disasters， such as earthquakes， hurricanes， and tsunami， are often 
compounded by organizational failures in emergency management (Kreps 
1984， Quarantelli 1978， Tiemey， Lindell， and Perry 2001). Simi1ar1y， the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster was caused primari1y by organizational 
failures. For example， the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and the Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) lacked sufficient authority to enforce 
safety guidelines on electric power companies operating nuclear reactors. In 
tum， these organizational fai1ures stemmed from loopholes in the institutional 
framework of Japan's nuclear regulation. As the investigative reports pointed 
out， nuclear-related laws in Japan created the institutional environment in 
which operators of nuclear reactors could dominate regulatory agencies to the 
extent that the former were able to exercise decisive influence on the contents 
of safety guidelines and to sabotage the installation of countermeasures against 
earthquakes and tsunami. 
In this paper， 1 propose to extend this institutional perspective on the 
cause of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster by including the J apanese 
education system as part and parcel of the institutional framework of nuclear 
regulation. Although the education system does not directly regulate operators 
of nuclear reactors， it is a key institution in the production and distribution of 
expertise required of effective enforcement of nuclear regulation. Specifically， 
1 argue that the J apanese education system contributed to the creation of 
organizational fai1ures responsible for the nuclear disaster in two crucial ways. 
First， the Japanese education system produces only a small number of experts 
in the fields relevant to nuclear regulation， such as nuclear engineering and 
seismologぁandaligns top同ranlcedexperts with the pro聞nucleargovernment 
and electric power companies. As a result， counter-experts who could 
question the existing system ofnuclear regulation were marginalized in Japan， 
which allowed the pro-nuclear camp to maintain the “safety myth." Second， 
the Japanese education system emphasizes moral and natural岡田ientific
Education as the Weakest Institutional Link in Japan's Nuclear Regulation 35 
perspectives in energy and environmental education while neglecting social-
scientific perspectives capable of critically examining economic， social， and 
political factors shaping Japan's energy and environmental policy. This neglect 
of social science at the nationallevellikely made Japanese policymakers il聞
equipped to effectively diagnose and solve organizational problems in nuclear 
regulation. 
In short， the Japanese education system was structured to marginalize 
counter-expertise as well as downplay social-scientific expertise， and this 
allowed organizational failures to persist in the institutional企ameworkof 
Japan's nuclear regulation and eventually contributed to the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Disaster. Thus， toprevent future organizational fai1ures in Japan's 
nuclear regulation， it will be insufficient to reform only the legal component of 
the institutional framework to increase authority， autonomy， and transparency 
of the regulatory agencies. It will be also necessary to reform the educational 
system as the weakest institutionallink in Japan's nuclear regulation. 
Problems in Japan's Nuclear Regulation 
As the NAIIC report put it， the situation of Japan's nuclear regulation 
prior to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster was characterized as 
“regulatory cap知re，in which the oversight of the industry by regulators 
effectively ceases" (NAIIC 2012b: 43). Such regulatory cap印rehappened for 
two related reasons. First， Japan's nuclear-related laws gave two regulatory 
agencies， NSC and NISA， insufficient authority to enforce safety measures on 
operators of nuclear reactors. Second， the operators had far more expertise in 
the fields of science and engineering relevant to nuclear power than did NSC 
andNISA. 
Weα'k Authority 01 Regulαtors over Opeγαtoγs 
Japan's nuclear industry began to develop in December 1955， when 
the Diet passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law and同10other laws to authorize 
the creation of governmental organizations to promote the “peaceful" use of 
nuclear power. According to these laws， the Japanese government created the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) within the Prime Minister's Office to 
oversee nuclear，回relatedpolicies. Director of the newly created Science and 
Technology Agency (STC)， an agency responsible for research on nuclear 
power， chaired AEC， while STC staff served as its secretariat. Concurrent1y， 
Japanese manufacturing companies began to form associations to import 
nuclear-related technologies from the United States; for example， Mitsubishi 
partnered with Westinghouse， and Toshiba and Hitachi with General Electric. 
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Under the leadership of the first AEC chair Shoriki Matsutaro， Japan began to 
adopt a two-track approach to nuc1ear power: manufactures and electric power 
companies pursued commercial use of nuc1ear power by importing technologies 
企omthe United States， whereas STC focused on scientific research on nuc1ear 
power by aiming to innovate nuc1ear-related technologies (Yoshioka 2011: Ch. 
1). 
明司lenTEPCO asked AEC for permissions to construct multiple 
nuc1ear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi between 1966 and 1971， there was no 
regulation regarding anti-seismic measures. In fact， no standards of nuc1ear 
safety were legally codified at the time. Since the J apanese government was 
decidedly pro-nuc1ear， ithad no organization dedicated to enforcing nuc1ear 
safety and instead left the responsibility to electric power companies. Thus， 
TEPCO conducted its own survey and estimated 265 Gal as the peak ground 
acceleration in case of an earthquake in the Fukushima area. AEC then 
approved TEPCO's estimate and authorized the construction ofthe Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuc1ear Power Plant (NAIIC 2012b: 63-64). 
But， after the nuc1ear vessel Mutsu caused an accident that released 
radioactivity企omits reactor in September 1974， the J apanese government began 
to establish an institutional企ameworkfor nuc1ear regulation. In September 
1978， AEC created the Guide1ine for Anti-seismic Design Regarding Nuc1ear 
Reactor Facilities for Electricity Generation. In October 1978， the Nuc1ear 
Safety Commission (NSC)， consisting of five specialists (most1y university 
professors)， was newly created within the Prime Minister's Of:ice to define 
guidelines on nuc1ear regulation. Separating NSC from AEC， the Japanese 
gove口nnenttried to create an independent regulatory agency. Then， inJuly 
1981， NSC revised the Guideline for Anti-seismic Design to speci今370Gal 
as the peak ground acceleration that nuc1ear reactors must withstand in case of 
an earthquake. 
The 1978 reform， however， was hampered by two problems. First， 
no law existed to enforce “backfit，" an act to apply new safety standards to 
the existing nuc1ear reactors. All NSC could do was to request operators of 
the existing nuc1ear reactors to conduct “anti-seismic backchecks，" to examine 
whether these reactors c1eared new safety standards. This meant that Japan's 
nuc1ear regulation depended on whether the operators would volunteer to 
backcheck and backfit their nuc1ear reactors to meet new safety standards. 
Moreover， NSC's Common Issue Discussion Panel specifically stated in 1991 
that“the accident management. •• shall be considered and imp1emented by the 
operators based on their ‘technical competency' and ‘expertise'， but shall not 
require the authorities to regulate the specific detai1s of measures" (reprinted 
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in NAIIC 2012b: 28). Here， NSC 1egitimated the institutiona1企ameworkthat 
deprived the regu1atory agency of the power to enforce safety standards on the 
operators. 
Second， NSC borrowed its secretariat staff from STA， an agency 
that conducted research on nuc1ear techno10gies (e.g.， fast-breeder reactors) 
rather than on nuc1ear regu1ation. Whi1e NSC was supposed to function as an 
independent regu1atory agencぁitwas ac旬allyrun by government bureaucrats 
on 10an企omthe pro-nuc1ear STA. Moreover， inthe same year NSC was 
created， the power to grant permissions for constructing commercia1 nuc1ear 
reactors was transferred from AEC to the Ministry of Internationa1 Trade and 
Industry (MITI)， a predecessor ofthe Ministry ofEconomy， Trade and Industry 
(METI)， that had promoted nuc1ear power by working c1ose1y with e1ectric 
power companies since the 1ate 1950s. Then， inSeptember 1999， a nuc1ear 
accident happened at the Power Reactor and Nuc1ear Fue1 Deve10pment 
Corporation in Tokaimura， Ibaraki Prefecture， which caused two deaths and 
exposed more than 600 residents to radioactivity. This accident damaged STA's 
credibility that had been already tainted by the 1995 fire accident of Monju， 
a fast回breederreactor in Fukui Prefecture， and the 1997 exp10sion accident 
at a nuc1ear reprocessing p1ant in Tokaimura. As a resu1t， STA was abo1ished 
and incorporated into the Ministry of Education， Cu1ture， Sports， Science 
and Techno10gy (MEXT) in January 2001， when the Japanese government 
was structurally reformed to increase administrative e伍ciency.AEC and 
NSC therefore 10st their secretariats， whi1e many of the functions previous1y 
performed by AEC and NSC secretariats were transferred， through the same 
structura1 reform， toNISA， a regu1atory agency new1y created within the pro-
nuc1ear METI. 
After the 2001 structura1 reform， the Japanese government tried to 
strengthen nuc1ear regu1ation， inc1uding anti-seismic countermeasures. In 
September 2006， for examp1e， NSC revised the 1981 Guide1ine for Anti-
seismic Design by raising the anti-seismic safety standard企om370 to 600 Ga1 
in 1ight ofthe 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake and new findings in earthquake 
science. NISA then requested operators to conduct anti圃seismicbackchecks on 
their nuc1ear reactors according to the new NSC guideline by setting June 2009 
as the deadline for fina1 reports. By June 2009， however， TEPCO submitted 
to NISA on1y interim anti-seismic backcheck reports on Units 1 through 6 
of Fukushima Daiichi based on 1imited assessments. TEPCO a1so decided to 
postpone the comp1etion of comprehensive assessments unti1 January 2016 by 
disregarding NISA's origina1 request (NAIIC 2012b: 63-69). 
Simi1ar1y， TEPCO tried to discount countermeasures against tsunami. 
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In 1993， the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy requested TEPCO to 
estimate the maximum height of tsunami that could hit the Fukushima Daiichi. 
In response， TEPCO estimated the height as 3.5 meters. TEPCO increased the 
number to 5.7 meters in 2002 in response to the new estimate by the J apan Civi1 
EngineeringAssociation. Then， in2006， NISArequested the oper剖orsto devise 
concrete countermeasures against tsunami exceeding the estimated maximum 
height. By 2008， TEPCO recognized the possibility that tsunami could flood 
cooling water pumps to damage nuclear reactors in light of the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami and the 2005 Miyagi Earthquake. Around the 
same time， TEPCO also estimated that tsunami as high as 15.7 meters might 
hit Fukushima Daiichi. However， TEPCO did not install countermeasures until 
November 2009， and al it did was to modiちTcooling water pumps at Units 5 
and 6 to be able to withstand tsunami of 6.1 meters high (NAIIC 2012b: 83圃
86). 
Expertise Asymmetηbe削JeenRegulators and Operators 
The lack of sufficient authoriザ onthe part of regulatory agencies 
was compounded by another crucial organizational fai1ure caused by the 
institutional framework of Japan's nuclear regulation: regulatory agencies 
did not possess the amount of expertise necessa巧Tfor effectively regulating 
operators of nuclear reactors. All the investigative reports acknowledged that 
operators had far more expertise than did regulators (IC 2012， NAIIC 2012a， b， 
RJIF 2011). This expertise asymmetry manifested most clear1y in the process 
through which NSC deliberated on the necessity of installing countermeasures 
against a station blackout (SBO)， asituation where a nuclear power plant loses 
al power supplies. When NSC was preparing a new version of the Guideline 
for Anti四seismicDesign between 1991 and 1993， NSC staff requested electric 
power companies to draft a section ofthe new guideline on behalf ofNSC and 
allowed them to reject the possibility of a SBO. In fact， not only the leader of 
the NSC sub-committee responsible for examining SBO countermeasures was 
an employee of an electric power company on loan to STA， but also employees 
of TEPCO and the Kansai Power Electric Power Company attended every 
meeting of the sub同committeeand assisted NSC staff (NAIIC 2012b， 501). 
Although the NAIIC report described this situation as “おgulatorycap加re，"it 
may well be called “regulatory capitulation." 
The three investigative repo抗sblamed the system of employment of 
government bureaucrats for the lack of expertise on the regulator's side. In 
Japan， government bureaucrats consist roughly oftwo types: elites who rotate 
positions every 2-3 years， and norトeliteswho stay in the same positions for 
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relatively long time. Since elite bureaucrats occupied top positions in NSC's 
secretariat (STA prior to 2001 and the Cabinet Office thereafter) and in NISA， 
both NSC and NISA were unable to mobilize sufficient expertise in nuc1ear 
regulation. The employment system exc1uded non-elite bureaucrats in NSC and 
NISA who accumulated some expertise企omthe process of decision嗣making，
forcing leaders of the何roregulatory organizations to acquire knowledge of 
nuc1ear reactors企omemployees of electric power companies (NAIIC 2012b: 
558， RJIF 2012: 299). 
This organizational structure of Japan's regulatory agencies prevented 
the effective use of newnuc1ear-relatedknow ledge that began to accumulate after 
the 1986 Chemobyl Nuc1ear Disaster. In 1996， for example， the Intemational 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) upgraded its guidelines for countermeasures 
against a severe accident (SA). Moreover， countries like the United States and 
France began to expand the definition of SA to inc1ude tsunami， earthquakes， 
and terrorist attacks and updated their SA countermeasures accordingly. But 
NSC and NISA could not keep up with the changing intemational standards 
of nuc1ear regulation. As NSC chairman Madarame Haruki admitted after the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster，“It was a fundamental mistake not to 
consider a SA... Our safety standard has not kept up with the intemational 
standard at al. In a sense， we are conducting safety inspection based only 
on technical knowledge that was avai1able 30 years ago" (reprinted in NAIIC 
2012b: 121). 
To be sure， the Japan Nuc1ear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) 
was established in 2003 to provide NISA staff with expert knowledge of 
nuc1ear safety. Since NISA itself was part of the pro-nuc1ear METI， however， 
社didnot actively make use of JNES to improve nuc1ear regulation. In 2008， 
for example， JNES carried out research on how to improve assessments of 
countermeasures against earthquakes and conc1uded that tsunami posed high 
risks of causing damages to nuc1ear power plants， but the research result was 
not adopted by NISA (RllF 2012: 273). Since elite bureaucrats occupying 
top positions lmew that they would be rotated back to the pro-nuc1ear METI， 
they tended to avoid acting against METI's interests while working at NISA. 
Moreover， JNES outsourced approximately 85 % of its total budget to outside 
research institutes and manufacturers of nuc1ear reactors to conduct research 
on nuc1ear safety (RJIF 2012: 303). This indicates that JNES failed to provide 
NISA with independent expertise in nuc1ear safety. 
As a result， NISA was unable to check whether nuc1ear reactors 
in Japan actually met the safety standards specified in the NSC guidelines. 
Instead， NISA checked safety inspection reports submitted by operators simply 
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to see whether the operators conducted safety inspection according to the 
guidelines-without independently verifying the validity of the reports. As 
Hirai Norio， a technician who supervised the construction ofnuclear plants for 
twen勿years，testified，“Inspectors who lack skils cannot conduct meaningful 
inspection. But， inreality， regulatory agencies approve the construction simply 
by listening to explanations offered by manufacturers and engineers and by 
looking at required paperwork" (reprinted in Kaido 2011: 129). Thus， the 
vulnerabilities of the Fu1ωshima Daiichi Nuclear Plant against earthquakes， 
tsunami， and a SA persisted until March 1， 2011. 
Ongoing Refoγms of Jjαrpans NucleαγRegul，αtion 
In light of these institutional flaws and organizational failures that 
contributed to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster， the three investigative 
reports made recommendations on how to reform Japan's nuclear regulation. 
Roughly speaking， their recommendations revolved around the three keywords: 
independence， expertise， and transparency. First， the repo此srecommended 
that the institutional framework of nuclear regulation should make regulatory 
agencies independent of both promoters of nuclear power and operators of 
nuclear reactors. NISA， for example， lacked both kinds of independence: it 
depended on the pro四nuclearMETI in terms of human and financial resources 
and colluded with electric power companies in sabotaging the installation of 
adequate safety measures. Second， the reports ar思ledthat regulators needed 
to acquire more expertise than operators， so that the former can effectively 
conduct safety checks on the later. Specifically， the reports recommended 
that the term of employment at regulatory agencies should be lengthened to 
allow regulators to acquire sufficient expertise in nuclear safety. Finally， the 
reports recommended that the process of nuclear regulation should be made 
transparent to the public， sothat concemed citizens and NGOs can monitor 
activities of regulators and operators. 
In response to these recommendations， the J apanese govemment 
began to reform the institutional企ameworkof nuclear regulation. In September 
2012， the Nuclear Regulation Authority σほA)was established within the 
Ministry ofEnvironment (MOE) to replace NSC. The new law that authorized 
the establishment of NRA aimed to strengthen regulators' independence from 
the pro-nuclear METI and electric power companies; for example， almembers 
of NRA secretariat are banned from rotating to pro回nuclearministries and 
agencies as well as from switching to jobs in the nuclear industry. 1 
Although this ban can s仕engthenautonomy of regulators， it does not 
co町民tthe existing asymmetry of expertise between regulators and operators， 
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except by al10wing members ofNRA secretariat to accumulate expertise on the 
job. The Japanese govemment recognized this problem and thereby stipulated 
in the sixth artic1e of the new law that experts of nuc1ear safety should be 
actively recruited企omuniversities and research insti印tes，while members 
of the NRA secretariat should be guaranteed the oppo此unitiesto interact 
with people at universities and research insti旬tes，both inside and outside of 
Japan， toacquire up-to-date knowledge ofnuc1ear safety. Put another way， the 
Japanese govemment has begun to increase expertise available to regulatory 
agencies through cooperation with higher education. 
The Education System as a Producer and Distributor of Expertise 
Indeed， higher education or， more generally， the education system， 
is a key societal institution that produces experts by fulfil1ing two functions. 
One function is to institutionalize col1ective representations of the wor1d 
by inculcating common schemas in schooled populations (McEneaney and 
Meyer 2000). For example， social studies teach students how society works， 
and science teaches laws and mechanisms goveming the physical wor1d. 
The education system is a “secular religion" in modem society in the sense 
that it offers a cosmology based on“scientific rationality" (Meyer 1994). 
Another function is to institutionalize educational credentials as prerequisites 
for occupying positions in society (Meyer 1977). The education system does 
this by defining educational credentials as proxies of competence to perfoロn
certain tasks effectively. This is why the education system has become a locus 
of stratification in the contemporary wor1d (Bourdieu 1983). 
These two functions of the education system legitimate the value of 
expertise. At school， students leam that the wor1d， physical or social， has an 
order and can be explained by science， and that educational credentials serve 
as proxies of competence. Consequent1y， people come to believe that those 
who have acquired proper scientific knowledge-experts-should play an 
important role in solving societal problems (Benavot and Braslavsky 2007; 
Drori， Meyer， and Hwang 2006). Indeed， professionals are authorized to advise 
ordinary citizens and policymakers because their expertise is institutionalized 
at societallevel (Brint 1994). Especial1y in politics， natural and social scientists 
regular1y serve on policy commissions and give their input to policymakers 
who then propose and legitimate particular policies by invoking scientific 
expertise (Jasanoff 1990). This is why the Japanese govemment tries to reform 
the institutional framework of nuc1ear regulation to provide regulatory agencies 
with more expertise by strengthening their ties with universities and research 
institutes， which are central to the production of experts. 
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However， 1 argue that the government's reform plan is problematic 
because the Japanese education system itself fails to produce expertise 
necessary for strengthening Japan's nuclear regulation. First of al， the 
Japanese education system has produced a small number of experts in nuclear輔
related fields. Between 2008 and 2009， for example， a total of 302 students 
entered nuclear-related graduate programs in Japan， compared with a total of 
2，721 students in the United States during the same two-year period (Table 1).2 
This approximately nine-fold difference between Japan and the United States 
near1y doubles in proportion， when comparing the numbers of nuclear reactors 
in J apan and the United States at the time of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Disaster， 54 and 104， respectively. Similar1y， while the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) in the United States had near1y 4，000 staff members as of 
March 2011， NSC and NISAhad only about 430.3 
Table 1. Numbers of students entering nuclear-related fields 
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Here， the relatively small number of experts in nuclear-related fields in 
Japan seems to be rooted in the larger problem in Japanese higher education-
namely， the underdevelopment of graduate programs. Table 2 shows that J apan 's
overall Ph.D. graduation rate has been consistently below the OECD average 
since 1998， and that graduate programs in natural science and engineering in 
Japan produced significant1y fewer Ph.D.s in 2008， compared with some of 
the OECD member countries that the Japanese govemment designated as a 
reference group. 4 These data indicate that J apan has a small amount of expertise 
at the societallevel that can be mobilized for nuclear regulation. 
Table 2. Ph.D. graduation rates and numbers ofnew Ph.D.s 
grPadhu.Dat.egs rtao dgtuhe ae toipfon gpraudltae utai(otpin oernac) t etnhteagve poif cai 
Number ofnew Ph.D.s per million 
Natural science and Social science 
engmeenng 
1998 2003 2009 2008 2008 
Japan 0.5 0.8 0.9 42.8 8.3 
USA 1.3 1.2 1.2 76.5 25.6 
UK 1.2 1.8 1.2 141.9 42.4 
Germany 1.8 2 2.2 114.8(2009) 43.1(2009) 
OECD average 1.3 
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Moreover， 1 argue that the small number of experts， especially top-
ranked ones， tend to be monopolized by the Japanese govemment， which has 
weakened the capaciザofJapan's civi1 society to mobilize counter-expertise to 
challenge the existing collusion between the regulators and operators of nuc1ear 
reactors. In Japan， universities are ordered within a fair1y rigid hierarchy based 
on rankings that large， national cram schools create based on scores of practice 
entrance exams. According to these rankings， Tokyo Universiザ isalways 
considered as the most selective in Japan. Tokyo University was the first 
national university founded in 1886， and it has produced leaders in politics， 
industries， law， arts， and science. Since national universities were incorporated 
in 2004， To勾oUniversity has continued to receive by far the largest amount 
of funding from the Japanese govemment. Within the hierarchy of higher-
education institutions， Tokyo University is followed by a pack of six other 
former national universities (Hokkaido， Tohoku， Nagoya， Kyoto， Osaka， and 
Kyushu) and top private universities (e.g.， Keio and Waseda). 
This hierarchy is made c1ear and rigid by the nationwide educational 
practice， where students decide which universities they will apply for by 
matching their practice exam scores with university rankings created by the 
college preparation industry. These rankings are powerful to the extent that 
high school teachers (and parents) refer to them in advising students. The 
majority of high school students are also enrolled in cram schools， and high 
schools depend on the college preparation industry to make practice entrance 
exams. As a result， students across Japan intemalize a hierarchy ofuniversities. 
That is one of the most important effects of education as an institution: to 
inculcate common schemas within a population. Such an institutional effect 
is s廿ongin Japan where school curricula紅ehighly homogeneous because 
they are centrally regulatedちythe National Curricular Guidelines and various 
administrative directives issued by MEXT. 
Take， for example， the five NSC members who dealt with the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster: Madarame Haruki (chair)， Kugita Yutaka， 
and Oyamada Osamu graduated from Tokyo University， Shirotani Seiji from 
Kyoto University， and Kuzumi Shizuyo from Hiroshima University.5 Kugita 
has a Ph.D. in nuc1ear engineering， Madarame， Oyamada， and Shirotani 
have master's degrees in nuc1ear engineering， Kuzumi has a medical degree. 
Kugita， Madarame， and Shirotani were professors of nuc1ear engineering at 
Nagoya， Tokyo， and Kyoto Universities， respectively， while Oyamada was 
the head of the J apan Atomic Energy Research Institute， later restmctured 
and renamed as Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). Similar1y， among the 
newly appointed five NRA members， Shimazaki Kunihiko and Fuketa Toyoshi 
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graduated from Tokyo University. Tanaka Shun'ichi (chair) graduated企om
Tohoku University， Nakamura Kayoko from Tokyo Institute of Technology， 
and Oshima Kenzo dropped out企omTokyo University.6 Fuketa and Tanaka 
have Ph.D.s in engineering and worked at JAEA， Nakamura has a Ph.D. in 
science and specializes in medical isotopes， and Shimazaki has a master's 
degree in earthquake science and chaired the Seismological Society of Japan 
and the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction in Japan. 
In contrast， the social movement against nuc1ear power in J apan has 
very litle expertise in nuc1ear-related fields. Take， for example， the Citizens' 
Nuc1ear Information Centre (CNIC)， the most prominent NGO in the anti-
nuc1ear movement. Founded in 1975 by Takagi Jinzaburo (deceased in 2000)， 
a former professor in nuclear chemistry with a Ph.D. from Tokyo University， 
CNIC has organized numerous seminars and conferences and made policy 
recommendations on nuc1ear regulation. At the time of the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuc1ear Disaster， CNIC had three co-chairs and a few other白ll-timestaff 
members. Among the three co-chairs， Yamaguchi Yukio has a Ph.D. in nuc1ear 
engineering企omTokyo University， Ban Hide戸kihas a B.A. in literature from 
Waseda University， and Nishio Baku is a dropout企omTo勾oUniversity of 
Foreign Studies.7 In short， the most prominent anti-nuc1ear NGO has only one 
expert企oma top嗣rankeduniversity. 
To be sure， anti圃nuc1earNGOs themselves do not have to possess 
expertise but can cooperate with universi句rprofessorswho are experts innuclear-
related fields. Indeed， since the late 1970s， two associate professors and four 
lecturers specialized in nuc1ear reactors at Kyoto University has organized the 
Nuc1ear Safety Research Group (NSRG) to publish critical reports on dangers 
of nuc1ear reactors based on research on the Three Mile Island Accident and 
Chemobyl Nuc1ear Disaster.8 Especially after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear 
Disaster， two of the NSRG members， Imanaka Tets吋iand Koide Hiroaki， 
worked c10sely with anti-nuc1ear NGOs across Japan to give presentations 
to disseminate information about dangers of nuc1ear reactors and problems 
in Japan's nuc1ear regulation. However， NSRG is an exception: professors in 
science and engineering in Japan rarely cooperate with NGOs. Besides， since 
members of NSRG have been marginalized in their fields of research due to 
their activism， their credibility is not always recognized by ordinary citizens 
who do not take active part in the anti圃nuc1earmovement. 
In fact， this expertise deficit on the part of anti-nuc1ear NGOs seems 
to undermine their credibility in the minds of the Japanese public. The 2012 
online survey， the Edelman Trust Barometer， showed that respondents from 
eighteen countries rated NGOs as significant1y trustworthier than mass media， 
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co中orations，and govemments， whereas Japanese respondents rated NGOs 
as the least trustworthy organizations alongside the govemment. 9 The same 
survey also showed that university professors and technical experts continued 
to enjoy higher levels of trust than NGOs， even though trust in al types of 
organizations and professionals decreased after the nuc1ear accident. Similar1y， 
an online survey conducted by the Centre for Research on Trust and Safety 
in J apan in June 2011 showed that respondents trusted experts affiliated with 
universities and research institutes more than NGOs and govemment agencies. 10 
These surveys suggest that people in Japan retained their trust in experts even 
after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster. Thus， although public trust in 
the gove丘町lentdecreased after the nuc1ear disaster， they were not yet willing 
to trust NGOs， either. This low level of trust in both the govemment and 
NGOs therefore seems to help the former retain its relative advantage over 
the later: while the Japanese govemment continues to mobilize top-ranked 
scientific experts for its policy commissions， NGOs continue to have difficulty 
in mobilizing a sufficient number of counter-experts who can match their 
govemmental counterparts in terms of credentials and trustworthiness. 
Thus， inaddition to the asymmetry of expertise between regulatory 
agencies and operators of nuc1ear reactors， another asymmetry of expertise 
exists between the J apanese gove世田lentand the civil society， for the Japanese 
education system has produced a small number of experts in nuc1ear-related 
fields and aligned top-ranked ones with the pro-nuc1ear govemment. 1 argue 
that this asymmetry of expertise between the goverr盟国ntand the civil society 
has fundamentally compromised the institutional framework of Japan's 
nuc1ear regulation. The absence of “researchers in the wild，" experts capable 
of mobilizing critical counter剛expertiseagainst the govemment， prevents 
members of a democratic society from having robust scientific debates 
(Callon， Lascoumes， and Barthe 2009). Contrary to the perception of experts 
supporting their c1aims with “scientific truths，" it is the norm rather than the 
exception that experts are divided over a scientific problem under consideration 
(Latour 1999， 2004). Here， the fact that the quality and quantity of expertise 
that the Japanese govemment can mobilize with regard to nuc1ear regulation 
far exceeds its nongovemmental counterpart risks allowing the goveロrmentto 
dominate public debates by prematurely forec1osing questions and objections 
企omcitizens. 
But 1 suggest that the problem with Japan's nuc1ear regulation runs 
even deeper: regulatory agencies， not to mention NGOs， seem to lack sufficient 
expertise not only in the fields of nuc1ear physics and engineering but also 
in the fields of social science pertaining to institutional and organizational 
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problems in nuc1ear regulation. Table 2 shows that in 2008 the number of new 
Ph.D.s in social science in Japan is about one fifth of the number in science 
and engineering. Compared with the other OECD countries that the Japanese 
government designates as a reference group， the absolute number of new 
Ph.D.s in social science is smaller in Japan. So is the proportion ofnew Ph.D.s 
in social science to those in science and engineering: 1 to5.2 in Japan， whereas 
1 to 3 in the United States， 1 to 3.3 in the United Kingdom， and 1 to 2.7 in 
Germany. 
Here， 1 argue that organizational failures within the institutional 
framework of Japan's nuc1ear regulation are ultimately rooted in the significant 
weakness of social調印ientificexpertise. Generally speaking， science and 
technology紅ecoextensive with society (Jasanoff 2006; Latour 2004). This 
is also true of the act of operating nuc1ear reactors， which consists of complex 
assemblages of scientific knowledge， engineering technologies， and laws and 
organizations to coordinate actions of operators and regulators， among many 
other elements. This means that nuc1ear safety cannot be ensured only by 
nuc1ear scientists and engineers. It also requires expertise from people who 
specialize in studies of institutions， organizations， politics， and the economぁ
i.e. socia! underpinnings of nuc1ear power. Put another way， social-scientific 
expertise is as important as nafural-scientific expertise in helping to fix 
organizational and institutional problems in Japan's nuc1ear regulation. Yet， 
prior to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster， the J apanese education 
system significantly under圃producedthe former kind of expertise. Indeed， this 
fai1ure of the J apanese education system is evinced not only by the statistics 
presented above but also by the contents of school curricula and textbooks in 
energy and environmental education. 
Energy and Environmental Education in Japan 
In J apan， social science is marginalized in school curricula， compared 
with the humanities and natural science (Kusahara 2010). In high schools， for 
example， Japanese students choose one ofthe two tracks: arts and science. In the 
J apanese context，“arts" means the humanities， such as history and literature， 
whereas “science" means natural science. The same tracking is replicated at 
the level of higher education. Typically， social science is subsumed under the 
faculties of arts and considered as part of the humanities. Given that social 
science is not established as an independent field of research剖theuniversity 
level， social studies in primary and secondary education also remains weak. 
Indeed， social圃studieslessons in Japan's primary and secondary education 
predominantly focus on memorization of facts about history， the economy， and 
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the govemment. In social studies， students have few opportunities to develop 
the ability to critically examine the working of society by asking what kinds 
of social problems exist and how these problems come about (Tsuchiya 2011; 
Uozumi et a1. 2010). 
The weakness of social science and social studies is coterminous 
with the second structural problem in Japanese school curricula: their strong 
emphasis on moral education. MEXT defines moral education as the central 
pillar of school curricula. MEXT's Curricular Guidelines not only allocate 
week1y lesson periods to moral education but also require teachers to 
incorporate elements of moral education in lessons of al the other subj ects 
as well as in every important school event. 1 Even though moral education is 
indispensable for human development， itdemands students obey authorities 
and cooperate for group-level goals (Sato 2004; Tsuneyoshi 2001). For 
example， school activities in Japan often aim to inculcate in students respect 
for their seniors， such as teachers. Activities also try to instil the habits of 
orienting individual behaviors to groups. As a result， school activities in Japan 
tend to discourage students企omdeveloping the abilities to question the status 
quo， articulate their own thoughts， and work through disagreements. Given 
the educational emphasis on respect for authorities， Japanese students are 
not sufficiently trained in questioning whether orders企omthe authorities are 
reasonable or not. Nor are they comfortable with dissenting企omother group 
members because they are taught to give priority to group圃levelgoals over 
individual interests and needs. Those who question teachers and express their 
dissenting opinions are often regarded as disrespectful and selfish. 
This dominance of moral education vis-a-vis the weakness of social-
scientific orientation is reproduced in energy and environmental education 
in Japan (Table 3)，12 To begin with， lesson plans recommended by both 
govemmental and nongovemmental organizations give priority to moral 
lessons. Typically， these morallessons in energy and environmental education 
take臥TOforms. First， moral lessons promote outdoor activities to increase 
students' appreciation of and atiachment to the natural environment. This type 
of experientialleaming is most common at elementary schools. Second， moral 
lessons emphasize the importance of energy efficiency. They ask students to 
find ways to save energy in their daily activities by reminding them of the fact 
that electricity generation based on fossil fuel harms the natural environment. 
These lessons are moral in the sense that they try to inculcate in students certain 
values and dispositions to actively protect the natural environment. 
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Table 3. Classification of lesson plans in energy and environmental education 
Moral education Natural science Social scienc巳 Problemsolving 
(affective) (congnitive) (congnitive) (critical) 
Govennmental 29 
Nongovennmental 1 
Total 40(33.9%) 
3 
32 
35(29.7%) 
2 
32 
34(28.8%) 
0 
9 
9(7.6%) 
Total 
34 
84 
118(100%) 
That governmental lesson plans emphasize moral education is 
consistent with MEXT's Curricular Guidelines that define the objective 
of environmental education as “the cultivation of morality as the basis of 
education ofthe Japanese who will contribute to the conversation ofthe natural 
environment." 13 In加m，lesson plans offered by nongovernmental organizations 
focus on cognitive aspects of energy and environmental problems from 
perspectives of both natural and social sciences. These lesson plans focus on 
how to help students leam ways in which electrici旬isgenerated and consumed 
in society and help them understand existing environmental problems， ranging 
from local waste disposal to global climate change. 
As a result， energy and environmental education in J apan tends to 
marginalize a critical kind of social-scientific thinking that analyzes existing 
stmctures of society in such a way that students can explore ways to act on 
their knowledge to transform their local environment. Moral education， on the 
one hand， imposes certain values on students and thereby fai1s tocultivate the 
ability to critically analyze existing stmctures of society that cause various 
environmental problems. It can also minimize students' intemal and extemal 
“political efficacy" by confining the scope of their moral actions to their 
everyday life and by shielding them from critical encounters with the existing 
struc旬resof society (Kahne and Westheimer 2006). Cognitively oriented 
lessons in natural and social sciences， on the other hand， tend to provide 
students only with readi1y avai1able information to be memorized. Although the 
intake of new lmowledge is no doubt an important part of students' cognitive 
development， it does not offer them the oppo此unitiesto take actions outside 
the classroom to explore their political efficacy. 
To be sure， there are a small number of lesson plans that encourage 
students to critically debate pros and cons of nuclear power and explore 
ways to make society more sustainable. However， these lesson plans， ifthey 
are action-oriented at al， suggest to students only the promotion of energy 
efficiencぁakind of action that students can do easi1y and success白llywithout
calling into question the stmctural parameters of their everyday life and the 
mechanisms that cause energy and environmental problems. Missing from 
these lesson plans is the education of citizens with critical analytical skils and 
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keen interests in solving social problems confronting their society. 
This weakness of civic education is indeed consistent with the fact 
that Japan's civil society is largely subordinated to the government (Aldrich 
2010， Ogawa 2009， Pekkanen 2006， Schwartz and Pharr 2003). A majority of 
civic associations in Japan have traditionally played a supplemental role to the 
government by mobilizing local populations to help to implement government 
policies pertaining to economic development， education， and social welfare. 
Even though the Nonprofit Activities Promotion Law in 1998 increased the 
number of nongovernmental organizations in Japan， the majority of Japanese 
NGOs are chronically short on financial and human resources. Only a handful 
ofNGOs can afford to hire full-time staffto engage in extensive policy analysis 
and advocacy， and even these NGOs depend heavi1y on volunteer staf. Thus， 
in Japanese society at large， civic actors tend to be overpowered by the 
government. This weakness of Japan's civil society is， 1 suggest， compounded 
by the dominance ofmoral education， whereby many Japanese become adults 
without cultivating the habits of examining social problems critically and 
taking collective actions to challenge the status quo. 
But this does not mean that the Japanese government， which 
overpowers the civil society， has sufficient social同scientificexpertise. In fact， 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster has exposed that Japanese politicians 
andgove白血lentbureaucrats， too， lacked social園田ientificexpertise in critically 
diagnosing institutional fiaws and organizational failures in Japan's nuclear 
regulation and taking necessary actions to resolve them. Here， the weakness of 
social-scientific thinking is a society-wide problem. In this respect， the official 
statement from NAIIC chairman Kurokawa Kiyoshi is suggestive:“Whatmust 
be admitted-very pain白lly-isthat this was a disaster ‘Made in J apan'. Its 
fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of J apanese 
culture: our re宜保iveobedience; our reluctance to question authority; our 
devotion to 'sticking with the program'; our groupism; and our insularity" 
(NAIIC 2012a: 9). Even though Kurokawa's statement can be faulted for its 
essentialist stereotypes of the J apanese people and culture， itdoes contain a 
grain of tmth. Obedience to authority and subordination of individuals to a 
group has been promoted by moral education， the central pillar ofthe Japanese 
education system， atthe expense of civic education based on critical and action-
oriented social science. The nuclear disaster was indeed “made in Japan，" and 
the Japanese education system was partially responsible for it. 
Conclusion and Implicafions 
In this paper， 1 have argued that the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
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Disaster revealed the education system as the weakest link in the institutional 
framework of Japan's nuclear regulation. As the investigative reports pointed 
out， the nuc1ear disaster was caused primarily by the organizational failures of 
Japan's nuc1ear regulatory agencies， such as NSC and N1SA， allowing TEPCO 
to sabotage the installation of adequate countermeasures against earthquakes 
and tsunami. These organizational fai1ures in旬mstemmed from the flaws 
in the institutional framework of Japan's nuc1ear regulation: the regulators 
lacked both sufficient power to enforce safety standards on the operators and 
suf:icient expertise to effectively conduct safety checks on nuc1ear reactors. 
To address these problems， the Japanese govemment began to reform the 
institutional framework to give the newly established NRA suf:icient power 
to enforce safety standards on the operators and suf:icient organizational 
independence from pro-nuc1ear ministries and electric power companies. 
While the Japanese govemment is also trying to strengthen expertise avai1able 
to NRA， 1 have shown that this effort is insuf:icient because it does not fully 
consider the existing state of the J apanese education system as a key producer 
and distributor of relevant expertise. 
Put another way， any attempt to s廿engthenthe regulator's expertise 
needs to take into account the two existing weaknesses in the J apanese 
education system. First， the Japanese education system has produced only a 
small number of experts in nuc1ear-related fields and aligned top-ranked ones 
with thepro圃nuc1eargovemment. Unless the Japanese education system begins 
to produce a greater number of experts and allow top園rankedones to work with 
NGOs critical ofnuc1earpower， Japan's nuc1ear regulation will continue to risk 
being compromised by the pro-nuc1ear MET1 and electric power companies. 
Second， and perhaps more important， the Japanese education system has 
downplayed social science in favor of natural science. Since nuc1ear safety is 
located at the intersection of society and science-technology， greater expertise 
in nuc1ear.叩 latedfields alone will be insuf:icient to improve Japan's nuc1ear 
regulation. 1n fact， the Fukushima Daiichi Nuc1ear Disaster was caused mainly 
by institutional and organizational problems that would fal within the scope 
of social-science disciplines. It will be therefore crucial for the Japanese 
govemment to strengthen the regulator's expertise not only in nuclear-related 
fields of natural science and engineering but also in social science. 
To this end， 1 suggest that the Japanese gove口unentconsider two 
options. One is to expand graduate programs in both natural and social 
sciences so as to increase the amount of expertise at the societallevel-not only 
NRA will acquire suf:icient expertise to effectively regulate the operators of 
nuc1ear reactors， but also Japan's civi1 society will gain suf:icient counter同
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expertise capable of monitoring both the government and the operators. In 
fact， the govemment already began to push Japanese universities to strengthen 
their graduate programs in response to globalization of higher education in 
the ear1y 2000s (Ishikawa 2011， Yonezawa 2007). This effort by the Japanese 
government and universities to pursue prestige at the global level may well 
faci1itate the needed expansion of expertise in nuc1ear regulation at the societal 
leve1. Another option available to the Japanese government is to continue to 
shift the curricular focus from memorization to problem solving. Since the 
late 1990s， the J apanese government has revised the Curricular Guidelines to 
increase the weight ofproblem solving to educate the Japanese people with the 
“zest for living (ikiru chikara)" or the strength to thrive in a complex， constant1y 
changing global wor1d (Cave 2001， Ministry ofEducation 1996， Saito 2011). 
As part of this ongoing curricular reform， energy and environmental education 
in Japan can be made more problem-solving oriented so as to help students 
develop critical analytical skills and acquire political efficacy to take actions 
that will challenge the existing struc旬resof society. 
These educational reforms to strengthen social-scientific expertise 
are urgent1y needed in post-Fukushima Japan. A variety of important policy 
problems con企ontingJapan today are fundamentally political and economic 
in their nature. To name only but a few: how to promote renewable-energy 
technologies to decrease Japan's dependency on nuc1ear power， how to rethink 
fast-breeder fuel cyc1es vis-a-vis disposal of spent nuc1ear fuels. To tackle these 
problems， moral commitments to sustainability or technological innovations 
will be insu伍cient.N eeded is the ability to critically analyze and re-envision 
Japanese society 企omsocial岡田ientificperspectives. The cultivation of this 
ability will require significant reforms of the J apanese education system. 
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